Estimated Interest Rate Rules: Do they Determine Determinacy Properties?
Introduction
Since Taylor (1993) demonstrated that U.S. monetary policy could be described by a simple relationship between the short nominal interest rate, in ‡ation and the output gap, numerous papers have empirically analyzed interest-rate setting across countries and periods through such policy rules. With the widespread adoption of interest-rate operating procedures by central banks, the Sargent and Wallace (1975) warning of an indeterminate price level under an interest-rate peg is relevant, and empirics on how interest rates respond to various macroeconomic aggregates could therefore in principle be informative about an economy's determinacy properties. 1 One of the most famous empirical excursions into interest-rate setting, and the associated implications for determinacy, involves U.S. monetary policy in recent decades. Taylor (1999) , Clarida et al. (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) , inter alia, have presented evidence suggesting that monetary policy in the pre-Volcker era (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) did not adhere to the "Taylor principle." On the other hand, policy during the Volcker-Greenspan period (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) did. This implies that in the former period, the nominal interest rate rose less than one for one with in ‡ation in the long run, thus causing the real interest rate to fall with in ‡ation, and vice versa for the latter period. Combined with the logic of New-Keynesian models of monetary policymaking, which have recently become mainstream in theoretical and practical monetary policy analyses (see, Galí, 2008 , Walsh, 2003 , and Woodford, 2003 , these results have potential implications for inference about the stability properties of the U.S. economy. To ensure determinacy in these models, and thereby exclude the potential for arbitrary ‡uctuations in a rational expectations equilibrium, monetary policy must be properly speci…ed. 3 In a
Taylor rule where in ‡ation is the only argument, a necessary and su¢ cient condition is that the rule satis…es the Taylor principle, or, alternatively, is "active"in the language of Leeper (1991) . 4 Clarida et al. (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) therefore argue that they may explain the high and volatile in ‡ation in the pre-Volcker era as a result of a "passive"monetary policy inducing indeterminacy, and the lower and more stable in ‡ation during the "active"Volcker-Greenspan tenures as consistent with the U.S. economy being in a determinate equilibrium void of extraneously generated ‡uctuations.
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The purpose of this paper is to show that estimated coe¢ cients of interest rate policy rules may not reveal anything about the stability properties of an economy. To meet this end, I construct arti…cial data from stochastic simulations of a simple New-Keynesian model that shares all the basic properties of the models used to argue that such inference is possible. Speci…cally, the model has the feature that if the central bank's decision making is modeled as adherence to a passive Taylor-type rule, equilibrium will be indeterminate.
My analysis departs, however, from most empirical literature, in the sense that I model monetary policy as the outcome of optimization by the central bank. In theoretical terminology, this corresponds to a scenario that Svensson (2003) characterizes as a central bank adhering to a "targeting rule;" see also Rogo¤ (1985) and Walsh (2003, Chap. 8) .
(A bank modeled as adhering to a-potentially arbitrary-interest-rate rule, is said to be following an "instrument rule.") I have argued elsewhere (Jensen, 2002b ) that under a modeling strategy involving optimization, the …rst-order conditions for optimal policy, essentially the targeting rules, become determinants of the equilibrium dynamics, and being e¢ ciency conditions they help bring about determinacy (this is also one of the messages of Giannoni and Woodford, 2002 ). The intuition is that optimization circumvents a problem plaguing instrument rules.
They are subject to a reverse Lucas critique, in the sense that any structural shift in private sector behavior-say, a sunspot-driven increase in in ‡ation-is not triggering any change in policy behavior. Modeling monetary policy by an instrument rule in empirical analyses thus seems, from a methodologically point of view, completely at odds with the great care normally put into securing that private-sector behavior is micro founded and immune to the Lucas (1976) Bullard and Singh (2008) estimate Taylor-type rules for the U.S., Germany/Euro Area and Japan for di¤erent periods, and make inference about world determinacy properties based on the multi-country New-Keynesian model of Clarida et al. (2002) . 6 As Svensson (2003) puts it: "Macroeconomics long ago stopped modeling private economic agents as following mechanical rules for consumption, saving, production and investment decisions; instead they are now normally modeled as optimizing agents (...) It is long overdue to acknowledge that modern central banks are (...) optimizing to at least the same extent as private economic agents" (p. 467). 7 Using the argument that it is observed in the data is missing the point. It corresponds to model private-sector consumption behavior by an "old" Keynesian consumption function, because data exhibits a positive relationship between consumption and income. Schorfheide (2004) simply write "The central bank follows a nominal interest rate rule by adjusting its instrument to deviations of in ‡ation and output from their respective target levels. "(p. 193) .
Focusing on optimization, the arti…cial data I generate is always from a determinate equilibrium where the central bank does not adhere to an instrument rule. Nevertheless, the data may reveal Taylor-type rule relationships. 8 Importantly, whether they reveal active or passive Taylor rules, has by construction nothing to do with the model economy's stability properties. It only reveals that in equilibrium, in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate may move together more or less strongly. The determinants of determinacy, the underlying …rst-order conditions for optimal policy, are not identi…ed in such single-equation Taylor In particular, as the New-Keynesian model emphasizes forward-looking expectations, it follows from Kydland and Prescott (1977) that optimal policy su¤ers a time-consistency problem. I therefore compute optimal policies under both commitment and time-consistent, discretionary policymaking, and …nd that the associated empirical di¤erences are substantial. Under commitment policies, an econometrician believing in the presence of Taylor-rule behavior would be fooled to believe in indeterminacy, as a passive Taylor rule would be estimated. Nevertheless, the economy is determinate and in the best possible equilibrium.
In the particular model, commitment policies are characterized by history dependence (Woodford, 2003) , and in ‡ation is successfully stabilized by credible promises of future contractive policy. In equilibrium, the correlation between the current nominal interest rate and in ‡ation may be very low (and for some parameterizations even negative Other recent literature has also questioned whether one can infer anything about determinacy properties from estimated coe¢ cients of interest rate rules. For example, Cochrane (2007) argues that the coe¢ cients of a rule cannot be properly identi…ed. In a simple example with an active Taylor-type rule, he shows that the true coe¢ cient on in ‡ation will 8 Minford et al. (2002) exemplify how a money supply rule is observationally equivalent to a Taylor-rule policy, further emphasizing that what data shows need not re ‡ect what the central bank actually does.
9 I am not arguing that the U.S. experience thereby suggests that monetary policy was characterized by commitment in the pre-Volcker era and no commitment afterwards. I merely point out that a passive Taylor rule can arise in data from a determinate equilibrium under optimal policymaking with commitment. not be a determinant of the economy's dynamics, as its only role is to secure determinacy;
i.e., to establish the unstable root(s) which will pin down the unique equilibrium. Also, Beyer and Farmer (2007) question Lubik and Schorfheide's (2004) method of distinguishing between economic dynamics under indeterminacy and determinacy. Speci…cally, they exemplify how a stochastic second-order di¤erence equation under determinacy is observationally equivalent to a …rst-order di¤erence equation under indeterminacy driven by sunspot shocks (Cochrane, 2007 , makes a related point). Hence, they argue, a more thorough examination of the economic dynamics under passive and active policies, may not add further to inference about determinacy properties. Finally, from a theoretical angle, Davig and Leeper (2007) show that a passive Taylor-type rule need in itself not be an indication of indeterminacy, if private agents assign su¢ cient probability to the event that policy will shift to an active stance in the future.
In all of this related literature, the maintained assumption is that monetary policy decisions are made according to a mechanical rule. I, on the other hand, emphasize that if policy is performed at a level of sophistication matching that of private-sector decision making, then one may …nd empirical regularities resembling Taylor-type rule behavior.
The coe¢ cients, however, are functions of the deep parameters of the economy (including preference parameters of the central bank), and their size will not, even when perfectly identi…ed, provide clues about the economy's stability properties.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents theoretically, within the simplest possible model, how equilibrium relationships between the nominal interest rate and in ‡ation can look active or passive depending on the structural characteristics of the economy and depending on the assumption made about the type of optimization performed (commitment or discretion). Section 3 then presents the extended and more empirically oriented version of the model, as well as the empirical exercises on its data. Section 4 concludes, and the Appendix contains various derivations. 10 It should be noted that the results are cast within one (albeit popular) class of model. Other classes, e.g., do not necessarily prescribe active Taylor rules as needed for determinacy. E.g., models with money in the production function, models with loans constraints, limited participation models, or models of the …scal theory of the price level determination. On determinacy requirements in such models, see, e.g., Benhabib et al. (2001) , Carlstrom and Fuerst (2002) , Christiano and Gust (1999) and Woodford (1996) . However, my point that identi…ed Taylor-rule coe¢ cients are uninformative should carry through irrespective of the particular critical coe¢ cient values securing determinacy in an instrument-rule framework.
2. Optimal monetary policymaking and Taylor-type rules 2.1. The simple New-Keynesian model
To get a grasp of the main properties of the "empirical" results, this section presents some theoretical results in the most basic text-book version of the closed-economy NewKeynesian model. The micro-founded model is a log linearization of an imperfect competition model with sticky prices; see Galí (2008) , Walsh (2003) or Woodford (2003) for expositions. De…ning x t as the output gap, the consumption-Euler equation leads to the following IS curve:
The (short) nominal interest rate, i t , is the monetary policy instrument. The in ‡ation rate is t (the log di¤erence of prices between t 1 and t). E t is the rational expectations operator conditional upon all information up to, and including, period t. The shock t includes interest-insensitive spending and expected (log) changes in the natural rate of output. Aggregate supply is modeled by a New-Keynesian Phillips Curve:
which can be derived from a variety of optimizing supply-side models. The term " t is a shock, often labelled a "cost-push" shock, cf. Clarida et al. (1999) , and it involves any variation in t unexplained by the output gap and expected future in ‡ation (for example variations in …rms'mark-up). It is assumed that " t = " t 1 + t , where 0 < 1 and t is a white-noise innovation.
In this model, the Sargent and Wallace (1975) indeterminacy result applies, as a pure interest rate peg leads to an indeterminate equilibrium; cf. Woodford (2003) . 11 To understand this, consider a sunspot-driven increase in in ‡ation expectations. With a constant nominal interest rate, the real interest rate falls. This stimulates demand and the output gap. Through the interaction of the IS and Phillips curves, this increases current in ‡ation more than the increase in expected in ‡ation. The increase in expected in ‡ation therefore initiates an increase in output and in ‡ation, which is followed by the variables' gradual return to steady state. As the increase in in ‡ation expectations is of arbitrary size, one cannot pin down a unique non-explosive rational expectations equilibrium.
At this point researchers often close the model with a speci…cation of nominal interest rate setting taking the form of a Taylor-type rule, e.g.,
The resulting system (1), (2) and (3) 
indeed re ‡ecting that variations in in ‡ation and the output gap are disliked. Under the model (1)- (2), L may represent a second-order approximation to the (negative of the) utility of a representative agent in the economy (Woodford, 2003) . In that case, the preference parameter is a function of the structural parameters of the model, but for sake of generality [e.g., allowing (4) to represent a delegated loss function], I treat as
independent. An optimizing central bank is assumed to determine policy with the aim of minimizing L subject to (1) and (2). The relevant optimality conditions (in this simple case, just one) will add to the dynamic system, and the associated rational expectations equilibrium is denoted an optimizing central bank equilibrium-an "OCBE." 13
Optimal monetary policy under discretion
Under discretionary policymaking, the central bank solves (1) and (2); (5) where minimization is performed on a period-by-period basis. The resulting necessary …rst-order condition is
Used in (2), one obtains the expectational di¤erence equation for in ‡ation:
Since t is free and the eigenvalue (1 + 2 = ) = is strictly greater than one, it follows from Blanchard and Kahn (1980) that t has a unique, non-explosive rational expectations solution. Using this together with (6), the unique solutions for t and x t can be written:
Hence, the OCBE exhibits real determinacy. I.e., the rational expectations solutions for output gap and in ‡ation are unique functions of the fundamentals of the economy, here just represented by the predetermined variable " t (as the central bank completely neutralizes the e¤ects of the shock t ).
Intuitively, consider the situation where a sunspot-driven increase in in ‡ation expectations was occurring. Absent any policy reaction, current in ‡ation and the output gap would increase. A central bank operating with the aim of price and output gap stability, however, would immediately raise the interest rate in order to bring in ‡ation and output towards their targets. In consequence, the imagined increase in in ‡ation and the output gap cannot be part of a bounded rational expectations equilibrium. The …rst-order condi-tion (6) precludes this, as the condition shows that the central bank acts so as to equate the marginal loss in terms of output gap and in ‡ation to zero. In this simple model, it implies that in equilibrium any co-movement between the output gap and in ‡ation is negative. Consider then a candidate equilibrium in which the relationship between in ‡ation and the output gap is given by x t = (!= ) t , where ! is some parameter. Inserting this relationship into (2) yields the di¤erence equation
This leads to in…nitely many solutions for t only if (1 !) 1 is numerically greater than one. A necessary condition for this is ! > 0. I.e., under indeterminacy, the co-movement between in ‡ation and the output gap is positive. This, however, contradicts the …rst-order condition guiding optimal monetary policy; hence, determinacy prevails in an OCBE.
To derive the nominal interest rate that will be observed in an OCBE, lead t and x t as given by (8), and take period t expectations to get
which together with x t inserted into (1), yields
If one replaced (3) by (9) and examined the associated IRE, one would …nd indeterminacy, as (9) is a function of exogenous variables only; cf. Svensson and Woodford (2005) . However, (9) is not the only way of expressing the OCBE value of the nominal interest rate. As stressed by Giannoni and Woodford (2002) for a general class of models, one can write the nominal rate as in…nitely many equilibrium relationships with predetermined and other endogenous variables. In this model one has:
where there is one restriction on the coe¢ cients fa i g 1 i=0 , fb i g 1 i=0 and c (see Appendix A):
As a result, one can empirically only uniquely identify one of the coe¢ cients, and nothing in theory points to anyone being more appropriate than the other. This suggests that empirically examining equilibrium relationships between the nominal interest rate and macroeconomic variables may not yield an appropriate answer as to whether determinacy prevails or not. One can represent the determinate OCBE as equilibrium relations between the nominal interest rate, which will lead to an indeterminate IRE [as in the case of (9)].
However, one can also represent it as relations between the interest rate and endogenous variables that would render the associated IRE determinate. To see this, note that as there is only one restriction on this representation, (11), one can only express the nominal interest rate as a unique function of one endogenous variable. One of these representations is the one presented by Clarida et al. (1999) . It expresses the nominal interest rate as a function of the one-period ahead in ‡ation expectations, and thus depicts a forward-looking Taylor This results in the following expression:
Note that the coe¢ cient on expected in ‡ation is greater than one, implying that any increase in expected in ‡ation is associated with an increase in the real interest rate. The nominal interest rate is thus in conformity with the Taylor principle. An IRE based on
(1), (2) and (12) However, if one assumed that the central bank followed a Taylor-type rule based on current in ‡ation, results and inference change dramatically. In that case, all parameters 14 E.g., an arbitrary increase in E t t+1 can be self-ful…lling, as it implies a huge fall in demand and output and, hence, current in ‡ation, because of the strong increase in the real interest rate. The economy will then "zig zag" back to steady state (e.g., E t t+2 would be below steady state, which is consistent with E t t+1 being above, as the real interest rate in t + 1 would fall strongly thereby pushing up output and in ‡ation above steady state in t + 1).
15 Numerical simulations presented by Clarida et al., 2000, show that the critical value of b 1 above which indeterminacy prevails is empirically unrealistically large.
and c in (10) except b 0 are zero, and (11) implies
As evident, the coe¢ cient on t can be greater or smaller than one, which implies that an IRE associated with this interest rule would be indeterminate for some parameter constellations (those where b 0 is lower than one), and determinate for others. Hence, correct econometric identi…cation of b 0 could lead to the erroneous inference that the economy is in an indeterminate regime.
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As an aside, note also that di¤erences in estimated coe¢ cients over time and countries, need not re ‡ect di¤erences in preferences for in ‡ation stabilization. Even though is a determinant of both b 1 and b 0 , other structural parameters play a role for their size under optimal policymaking. Also, note that (12) and (13) Svensson, 1997) .
Optimal monetary policy under commitment
I consider now the case where an optimizing central bank has the ability to credibly commit to a policy plan for the entire future. The assumption of discretionary optimization is therefore abandoned in favor of an assumption that the bank acts in accordance with commitment under a "timeless perspective" (Woodford, 1999) . It turns out that the resulting equilibrium relationships between the nominal interest rate and endogenous variables even stronger demonstrate that inference about determinacy properties from these can be erroneous. Solving (5) under commitment, leads to the following relevant …rst-order condition (see, e.g., Walsh, 2003, Chap. 11) :
16 Also, note that one can express i t as a function of the one-period ahead expectation of the output gap. It immediately follows by (6) and (12) that the interest rate expression in this format would become
An IRE under this interest rule is always indeterminate; see Jensen (2002b, Appendix C). which along with (2) characterize the OCBE as a second-order di¤erence equation in x t ,
It has real and positive roots
with one root smaller than one and the other above one. The equation thus identi…es a unique, non-explosive rational expectations equilibrium solution for x t . The solution is easily recovered by the method of undetermined coe¢ cients. Combining this solution with (14), the unique solution for t follows. The OCBE under policy commitment can be written as
Note the di¤erence of the solution with the one under discretion. In contrast with (8), the solution under commitment includes the lagged value of the output gap. This re ‡ects the optimality of "history-dependent"policy, or "inertial policy,"as stressed by Woodford (1999 Woodford ( , 2003 . In this model, such behavior induces a more favorable in ‡ation-output gap trade-o¤ in the following sense. Consider the case where the economy is hit by a (positive) cost-push shock. By committing to continue the associated contractive policy into the future, the central bank lowers in ‡ation expectations, which dampens current in ‡ation and thus helps to stabilize the shock.
As under discretion, one can characterize the path of the nominal interest rate as function of the predetermined variables, here x t 1 , " t and t . Lead t and x t as given by (15), apply the value of x t , and take period t expectations to get
which together with x t inserted into (1) yields
Paralleling the discussion of (9), which describes the interest rate in case of discretion, an instrument rule characterized by (16), may result in an indeterminate IRE (unless the coe¢ cient on x t 1 is positive and su¢ ciently large; cf. Jensen, 2002b) . This re ‡ects once more that identi…cation of a passive interest rate rule may lead to inference of indeterminacy, even though the economy is in a determinate OCBE. As under discretion, the unique OCBE value of the nominal interest rate can be represented by in…nitely many equilibrium relationships between the predetermined variables and current or expected leads of the other endogenous variable. In contrast with discretion, two restrictions on the relationships must be satis…ed since there are two predetermined variables (apart from t , which does not play a role; cf. above). One gets
with two restrictions on the coe¢ cients fa i g
, c and d (see Appendix B):
i 1
As the purpose of this exercise is to show that estimated equilibrium relationships tell little about determinacy, consider the representation which most closely corresponds to (12); i.e., the often presented equilibrium representation under discretion. This would now be a case of i t = b 1 E t t+1 + a 0 x t + (1= ) t , and where b 1 and a 0 are identi…ed by (18) and (19). The following expression emerges:
Hence, a 0 = 0, b 1 < 1 and one cannot even rule out that b 1 < 0. That is, in equilibrium-a determinate equilibrium-there may be a negative relationship between the nominal interest rate and in ‡ation expectations, and it is always the case that the Taylor rule is passive. 17 The reason is the history dependence of policy, where a contraction in period t is expected to be followed by a future contractive stance. As this reduces in ‡ation expectations, equilibrium policy is contractive in period t, i.e., the real interest rate increases, when the nominal interest rate either increases (in which case the correlation between i t and E t t+1 is negative), or decreases less than in ‡ation expectations do (in which case the correlation between i t and E t t+1 is positive but less than one).
Note also that since there are restrictions on the relationship between coe¢ cients under optimal policymaking, one cannot hope to independently identify coe¢ cients in estimations containing several variables. 18 As evident by the previous example, a 0 = 0 prevails in an estimation. This not only could lead to the erroneous inference that the central bank does not care about output gap ‡uctuations, but it also shows that there is a limit as to how many coe¢ cients one can identify in policy rules. E.g., in the case of discretion, one would not be able to identify coe¢ cients on in ‡ation and output gap independently. From the model, only a linear combination of the coe¢ cients will be identi…able. Needless to say, the adverse implications for inference about indeterminacy will be strong.
To exemplify in "practice" how estimations yield results that give false impressions about the economy's stability properties, I now move on to simulations on an extended model that allow for independent identi…cation of coe¢ cients on both in ‡ation and output gap; the coe¢ cients usually estimated in empirical applications.
3. Estimated Taylor-type rules under optimal policymaking
An extended New-Keynesian model as a data generator
The model used in the previous section is too simple to portray an empirically realistic scenario for monetary policymaking. In this section, the model is therefore amended in a number of empirically relevant directions. First, it is assumed that the output gap is predetermined one period ahead, and in ‡ation is predetermined two periods ahead. In consequence, monetary policy a¤ects the output gap with a one-period lag, and in ‡ation with a two-period lag. This seems to be broadly consistent with empirical regularities, 17 In the case where is formulated as a function of the model's structural parameters, one has = = where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods. The coe¢ cient on expected in ‡ation in (20) is then 1 = , which for plausible parameter values are negative. 18 When Clarida et al. (2000) present their Taylor-type rule to be estimated, containing a host of leads of in ‡ation and output gap, they state that "Approximate (...) forms of this rule are optimal for a central bank that has a quadratic loss function in deviations of in ‡ation and output from their respective targets" (p. 150-1). They do not mention that optimal behavior necessarily restricts the relationship between coe¢ cients. which show that e¤ects of monetary policy are …rst present in output (after some time) and then later in the in ‡ation rate; see Walsh (2003, Chapter 1) and the references provided there. From the perspective of the conventional Taylor rule relating the current interest rate to the current in ‡ation rate and output gap, this implies that endogeneity problems are avoided, and identi…cation of coe¢ cients are secured through OLS estimation. 19 Secondly, I introduce endogenous persistence in both the output gap and in ‡ation equations. Again, this is mainly empirically motivated; it is easy to reject that output and in ‡ation do not depend on their past values. See, e.g., Fuhrer (2000) on demand persistence and Galí and Gertler (1999) on in ‡ation persistence in U.S. data.
With these alterations, the equations for the output gap and in ‡ation become
and where g t+1 = g g t + g t+1 , 0 g < 1, is a demand shock process, and y n t+1 = y y n t + y t+1 , 0 y < 1, is the evolution of the stochastic natural rate of output (thus capturing technology shocks). The innovations g t+1 and y t+1 (and t+1 ) are i.i.d. and white noise. The parameters and , respectively, quantify the degree of endogenous persistence in demand and in ‡ation. Furthermore, remark that the described transmission lags of monetary policy are achieved as demand in period t + 1 is decided in period t (through the period t expectation of the real interest rate in period t + 1), and prices for period t + 2 are set in period t (through the period t expectation of the in ‡ation rate in period t + 3 and the expectation of the period t + 2 output gap). An interest-rate decision in period t thus cannot a¤ect demand in period t, but only demand in period t + 1 (given, of course, that the decision has implications for the period t + 1 real interest rate) and thus in ‡ation in period t + 2.
In this more elaborate version, the model cannot be solved in closed form. Instead, I
follow standard practice and express the model in state-space form and adopt conventional numerical solution algorithms for deriving optimal policies under discretion and commitment. See, e.g., Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986) or Söderlind (1999) on these methods, and Svensson (2000) and Jensen (2002a) for applications. These algorithms generally perform very well, but for the current model, convergence under discretion requires that the control variable enters the loss function. The loss function is therefore amended to
which allows for a (in the simulations small) loss from instrument variability per se. 20 In state-space form, the model is written as
where A is a 9 9 matrix, B 2 and B 1 are 9 1 vectors, X t [e g t y n t
is the vector of the predetermined variables, The model is, as mentioned, solved under the assumption of either commitment or discretionary policymaking. From each case, one recovers expressions for the dynamic evolution of the economy of the form
with X 1 given and 1 = CX 1 , where and C are matrices found by the solution algorithms (di¤ering, of course, between discretion and commitment). It is important to note that, by implication of the solution algorithms, (25) represents a case where only fundamentals matter for the dynamics of the economy (endogenous variables are a function of predetermined variables only). Hence, the OCBE under discretion and commitment are determinate by construction. Under both forms of policy, 9000 periods of data are generated by stochastic simulations of (25). From these simulations, time-series data for i t , x t , t , E t t+1 , E t t+2 are extracted for subsequent estimations of Taylor-type interest-rate rules.
As these estimations are meant to serve as illustrations of what can, and, in particular, what cannot, be inferred from these, the model given by (21)- (22) has not been calibrated so as to match business cycle properties accurately. The model is interpreted as quarterly, with in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate measured at annual rates, and the adopted parameter values have merely been chosen so as not to be grossly inconsistent with existing estimates of demand and in ‡ation equations, and so as not to give unreasonable unconditional standard deviations of the output gap and in ‡ation under either form of policy.
The parameter values, which to a large extent are similar to those in Jensen (2002a) , are summarized in Table 1 , where g , y , and " , respectively, represent the standard deviations of the innovations g t+1 , y t+1 , and t+1 (under this parameterization, the standard deviations of in ‡ation and the output gap are between 2 and 2:5 percent).
Estimation of Taylor-type rules: discretion vs. commitment
The estimated Taylor-type rules are of the general form:
where t is an error term. Each estimation uses only a subset of the right-hand side variables. 21 Estimation results for the benchmark parameterization when the central bank optimizes under discretion are reported in the upper half of a "*" denotes signi…cance at the 5% level b "I" denotes indeterminacy of the associated IRE; "D" denotes determinacy Table 2 : Coe¢ cients of estimated interest rate rules. Benchmark parameters depending upon the two-period ahead in ‡ation expectations (the time horizon at which policy can a¤ect in ‡ation), estimates suggest that policy has been conducted according to an "active"Taylor rule (even though it has not).
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Turning to the case where optimal policy is conducted under commitment, the lower half of Table 2 shows estimation results which never portray a Taylor-type rule behavior. In fact, the signs on in ‡ation measures are often negative (consistent with what was shown to be possible in Section 2.3 for the simple model). The associated IRE are always indeterminate, and an economist believing that policy has been conducted within an instrument-rule framework would in all likelihood call for a revision in policymaking advising that the central bank should respond more aggressively towards in ‡ation. This would be unwarranted, as the economy is in the optimal, and determinate, equilibrium.
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This illustrates that identi…cation of interest rate relationships in data re ‡ecting a behavior not in conformity with the Taylor principle, need not be a re ‡ection of disastrous monetary policymaking. In fact, in a New-Keynesian economy, it might as well re ‡ect the performance of a central bank acting optimal and with the ability to commit. 22 In all cases, the lagged interest rate is signi…cant but of small magnitude. 23 Note that the coe¢ cient on the lagged interest rate is now of considerably magnitude; not because the central bank has an objective to "smooth"interest rates per se, but because of the history-dependent policy it follows under commitment. Table 3 : Coe¢ cients of estimated interest rate rules. Deviation from benchmark: A more "conservative"central banker, = 0:1
Estimation of Taylor-type rules: further experiments
The preceding subsection showed that the estimated coe¢ cients on in ‡ation measures depend heavily on the type of policy regime. To further emphasize how the coe¢ cients are sensitive to di¤erent economic structures under optimizing central bank behavior, this subsection presents results for two economies that di¤er from the benchmark in terms of either policy preferences or in ‡ation persistence. Firstly, Table 3 reports results for the case where the central bank is assumed to be more in ‡ation averse, or, "conservative" in the terminology of Rogo¤ (1985) . The preference parameter is reduced to 0:1; i.e., output gap stabilization is now …ve times less important to the central bank relative to in ‡ation stabilization. As one would expect, the estimated parameters on the output gap becomes lower. The estimated parameters on the in ‡ation measures, on the other hand, increase only little. The inferences about determinacy properties one would make, compared to the benchmark, are almost the same.
Believing in interest-rate setting as a result of Taylor-rule policymaking, one would conclude the economy was in an indeterminate equilibrium from all estimations except those involving two-period ahead in ‡ation expectations. The only di¤erence from the benchmark case is that commitment policies now satisfy the Taylor principle in the regression with this in ‡ation measure and the lagged interest rate. Hence, even with a rather conserva- Secondly, Table 4 reports estimations of Taylor-type rules in an economy with more endogenous in ‡ation persistence relative to the benchmark. The parameter is raised to 0:5, such that lagged in ‡ation and expected future in ‡ation are equally important for in ‡ation determination. This changes inference about determinacy properties a lot. In all estimations based on data from discretionary policymaking, one would conclude that the economy was in a determinate equilibrium. All estimated coe¢ cients on in ‡ation measures increase. The reason is that with more in ‡ation persistence, any increase in in ‡ation has longer-lasting e¤ects, and an optimizing central bank will therefore …ght such increases more vigorously. This demonstrates that, apart from being uninformative about determinacy properties, di¤erences in estimated values in Taylor-type rules need not have anything to do with di¤erent preferences for in ‡ation stabilization. Under commitment, data also generate higher estimated values on in ‡ation measures-in some cases, however, one would still conclude that the economy was in an indeterminate equilibrium under the hypothesis that policy was performed under an instrument-rule framework. Note also that one of the speci…cations under commitment gives the impression that the economy is characterized by unbounded equilibria, even though it is not. 24
Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have investigated the issue of equilibrium determinacy within a simple model of the New-Keynesian variety. In particular, I examined if empirical analyses of nominal interest-rate setting provide lessons on whether an economy is in a determinate or an indeterminate equilibrium. This is motivated by recent literature which asserts that such lessons indeed can be drawn from data, implying that identi…cation of "bad policies"
(those leading to indeterminacy), indicates the presence of, or potential for, extraneous macroeconomic ‡uctuations. As these ‡uctuations are generally undesirable; such lessons obviously have profound policy implications.
I argue, however, that such empirical analyses may be misleading in terms of the information about determinacy they provide. When the underlying assumption about monetary policy behavior is that the central bank sets the interest rate with the aim of minimizing a loss function (i.e., the central bank is assumed to be an optimizing entity), then there is always determinacy in the simple New-Keynesian model. This may, as is well known, not be the case if the bank is adhering to an instrument rule, like a Taylor-type rule, where restrictions on the response coe¢ cients are needed to secure determinacy. The distinction between optimization-based behavior and instrument-rule behavior is therefore crucial.
Under the former type of behavior it can be seen analytically that in a determinate equilibrium, the relationships between the nominal interest rate and various macroeconomic variables will in some instances convey properties of an indeterminate equilibrium if the central bank is incorrectly assumed to follow an instrument rule.
In an empirically plausible extension of the simple New-Keynesian model, I extract arti…cial data from optimization-based policy under discretion and commitment. The data are then used for estimation of interest rate rules. In accordance with the theoretical insights, the estimated coe¢ cients will in some instances give the false impression of a policy conducive for indeterminacy. This is particularly prevalent under commitment policies, where the Taylor principle rarely holds (and the estimated interest rate reaction to in ‡ation may even be negative). Nevertheless, the economy is in a determinate equilibrium.
The analysis therefore emphasizes that empirical relationships between the nominal interest rate and macroeconomic variables reveal little about an economy's stability prop-erties if one is willing to accept that the central bank optimizes-just as all private agents in the economy are assumed to.
Appendix
A. Derivation of (11) In order for the nominal interest rate to be consistent with the OCBE values of current and expected future variables, it follows by (10) and (9) that the following relation must be satis…ed: and c must satisfy (11).
B. Derivation of (18) and (19)
In order for the nominal interest rate to be consistent with the OCBE values of current and expected future variables, it follows by (17) and (16) that the following relation must be satis…ed:
a i E t x t+i + c" t dx t 1 (B.1)
One can then successively forward the OCBE expressions for in ‡ation and the output gap, (15), in order to …nd If this is to hold for every value of x t 1 and " t ; it follows that the coe¢ cients fa i g
, c and d must satisfy (18) and (19).
